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PRIOR USER RIGHTS FOR BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS 
ROBERT C. HALDIMAN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The American Inventor’s Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA) introduces 
substantial changes in several aspects of the United States patent system, 
including the creation of a “First Inventor Defense.”  “Prior User Rights” of 
varying scope have long been debated as a reform to the patent system as a 
whole.1  The 1998 holding in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature 
Financial Group, Inc.2 allowing the patenting of “Business Methods” proved 
to be the catalyst for passage of the form of Prior User Rights legislation in the 
AIPA.3  For guidance as to patent claims and defendants that qualify for the 
new special rights, the AIPA offers only the following ambiguity: “[t]he term 
‘method’ means a method of doing or conducting business.”4 
The legislative history of the AIPA reflects the dynamic tension between 
the advocates and opponents of Prior User Rights.  The Committee report, 
debate and hearings contain language to support both the limitation of the new 
personal defense to cases asserting patents considered to be “Business 
Methods,” for example, with respect to patents under United States Patent and 
 
* Mr. Robert C. Haldiman practices patent law at Thompson Coburn LLP, St. Louis, Missouri.  
Rhaldiman@thompsoncoburn.com. 
 1. See, e.g., Hearings on Prior User Rights before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. and 
Judicial Admin., 102nd Cong. 1992 (1994); Kyla Harriel, Prior User Rights and the First to 
Invent Patent System: Why Not?, 36 IDEA 543 (1996); Lisa Brownlee, Trade Secret Use of 
Patentable Inventions, Prior User Rights and Patent Law Harmonization, 72 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 523 (1990); Gary Griswold et al., Prior User Rights: Neither A Rose 
Nor a Thorn; 2 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 233 (1994); Gary Griswold & F. Andrew Ubel, Prior 
User Rights: A Necessary Part of a First-to-File System, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 567 (1993).  
See also infra note 108. 
 2. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 3. The general consequences and wisdom of segregating a particular subject matter for 
different rights and procedures is beyond the scope of this article.  It is notable that plants, 
computer chips (mask works) and designs are the subject of entirely separate statutes, which are 
clearly defined.  Medical methods have been treated separately within 35 U.S.C. Chapter 7, but 
are a far smaller and less contentious area than Business Method Patents currently are. 
 4. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA) § 4302, 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(3) 
(1999). 
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Trademark Office (USPTO) Class 7055 and the expansive application of the 
defense to any method of conducting a company’s business, including 
manufacturing processes. 
Since the State Street Bank decision in 1998, Business Method Patents 
have been perceived to be available as 35 U.S.C. § 101 subject matter per se.6  
The case has engendered a race to the USPTO to claim patent estates on 
technology heretofore primarily protected only by trade secret law.  The 
specter of second comers to a technology enjoining good faith prior inventors 
merely by beating them to the patent office motivated the 1999 reforms.7 
While the circumstances prompting the reform are well known, it has been 
left for the courts to define the extent and contours of what “methods of doing 
or conducting business” are subject to the reforms.  Litigants will have strong 
strategic incentives to characterize patents asserted in infringement actions as 
business methods, or not.  Tactics will be complicated by the fact that Prior 
User Rights do not invalidate the patent.8  In defending a non-Business Method 
Patent, prior art qualifying under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) can invalidate the asserted 
patent.  Further complicating a defense against infringement claims based on 
patents, which may or may not be “business method” patents is the fact that 
assertions of Section 102(g) prior art, often understood as “secret” prior art, 
have not enjoyed the benefit of clear, non-contradictory case law in all 
circumstances.9  Finally, a defendant is free to assert Prior User Rights and 
Section 102(g) invalidity against the method claims of the same or related 
patents and Section 102(g) invalidity against the apparatus claims 
simultaneously. 
Some commentators have criticized the new AIPA for endorsing trade 
secret protection, discouraging disclosure, assigning different rights to 
different classes of patents and for the uncertainty of the AIPA in its failure to 
define its own scope.10  The creation of a patent system in which different 
rights will apply to different classes of subject matter raises concerns for all 
practitioners, especially since the dividing line between the different classes is 
unknown. 
This article reviews the provisions of the AIPA.  The arguments for broad 
application of the new defense will be reviewed and found to be less than 
 
 5. Class 705 consists of Data processing: Financial, Business Practice, Management, or 
Cost/Price Determination, at www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/def/705.htm (last 
modified Oct. 6, 2000). 
 6. See infra note 169, for a discussion on the history of the Business Method Patent. 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 71 - 106, for a discussion on legislative history. 
 8. AIPA, § 4302, 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(9) (1999). 
 9. See infra text accompanying notes 144 - 156, for a discussion on § 102 case law.  See 
also infra text accompanying notes 144 - 49. 
 10. James R. Barney, The Prior User Defense: A Reprieve for Trade Secret Owners or a 
Disaster for the Patent Law?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 261 (2000). 
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compelling.  Moreover, the background, including the legislative history, 
behind the AIPA will be examined.  It will reveal a consensus that Prior User 
Rights should apply to State Street Bank and e-commerce type Business 
Method Patents and sharp conflict over any application beyond that.  
Significantly, the legislative history will also show that the “substance” of the 
type of the technology at issue should prevail over the form of the patent 
claims covering it when deciding if the new defense applies. 
Additionally, avenues will be explored through which the scope of the new 
defense may be defined, including further legislation, the USPTO classification 
system and judicial construction.  Furthermore, the history of the Business 
Method Patent exception will be outlined to shed light on what technology 
developers and patent practitioners consider the subject to include.  A range 
will be found from a narrow reading of Business Method Patents only as those 
patents without novelty beyond the accounting methods or logistics solutions 
they execute, a broader reading including data processing and a still broader 
reading encompassing the software that actuates the business methods.  
Broadest of all is the Prior User Rights advocate’s goal of including all 35 
U.S.C. § 100(b) processes. 
Finally, the case law construing 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) will be reviewed.  That 
section provides for the invalidity of a patent for lack of novelty if a prior user 
had reduced the same invention to practice, unless that prior user had 
“suppressed or concealed” her version of the invention.  If the prior use was 
“suppressed or concealed,” as by a trade secret, Section 102(g) subordinates 
the prior user to the patent rights of the later inventor who disclosed the 
technology by filing for a patent.  Application of the rule has not been so 
simple.  Case law blurs Section 102(g)’s would be bright line rule by 
distinguishing between prior uses that inform the public to some extent and 
those that do not inform at all.  In the former case, some prior users have 
successfully invalidated later patents. 
In conclusion, a concordance is suggested between the public disclosure 
inherent in the exercise of software implemented Business Methods and the 
Section 102(g) case laws efforts to balance the policy of encouraging 
disclosure with any equities due a prior inventor who elects not to patent.  
Since this equitable balance is the stated goal of the First Inventor Defense, it 
is further suggested that defining the scope of that defense in view of Section 
102(g) evaluation of the degree to which a prior use informed the public may 
provide a method for construing the new defense that does the least violence to 
the traditional patent system and provides greater certainty in its application. 
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II.  PRIOR USER RIGHTS DEFENSE UNDER THE AIPA 
A. Generally 
The 1999 legislation enacts several significant reforms in U.S. patent 
practice, including new provisions such as publication of applications after 
eighteen months from filing,11 special protection for individual inventors12 and 
Prior User Rights for Business Method Patents.13  It also refines some old 
provisions, such as limited interpartes re-examination14 and term extensions for 
“USPTO” delays.15  The primary focus of this paper is the Prior User Rights 
Defense for Business Method Patents. 
The Prior User Rights provision is limited to “methods of doing or 
conducting business.”16  The defense is personal and available only to an entity 
that reduces to practice and commercially uses the subject Business Method 
technology.17  Establishment of the defense does not invalidate the patent 
asserted against it.18 
The defense is established as follows: a defendant must have acted in good 
faith;19 the defendant must have actually reduced the invention to practice at 
least one year before the effective filing date of the asserted patent;20 and the 
method must have been commercially used before the filing date of the 
asserted patent.21  “Commercial use” means use in the United States, “. . .in 
connection with an internal commercial use or an actual arms-length sale or 
other arms-length commercial transfer of a useful end result, whether or not the 
subject matter at issue is accessible to or otherwise known to the public . . . .”22  
Premarketing regulatory review is within the scope of commercial use under 
the Act.23  Nonprofit researchers’ use by universities or hospitals, for example, 
qualifies as commercial use.24  Nonprofit use may be asserted as a defense only 
 
 11. AIPA, § 4500, 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1999). 
 12. AIPA, § 4101, 35 U.S.C. § 297 (1999). 
 13. AIPA, § 4301, 35 U.S.C. § 273 (1999). 
 14. AIPA, § 4600, 35 U.S.C. § 311-18 (1999). 
 15. AIPA, § 4402, 35 U.S.C. § 155 (1999). 
 16. AIPA, § 4302, 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(3) (1999). 
 17. Id. § 273(b)(6). 
 18. Id. § 273(b)(9). 
 19. Id. § 273(b)(1). 
 20. Id. § 273(b)(1).  This bright line limitation coincides with § 102(b)’s one-year period that 
bars patentability if the technology has been publicly used, sold or offered for sale by anyone, 
including the patent applicant, more than one year before filing. 
 21. AIPA, § 4302, 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1) (1999). 
 22. Id. § 273(a)(1). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. § 273(a)(2). 
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by the nonprofit entity and such a defensible use may not be subsequently 
licensed out for commercial use.25 
Methods defensible under the AIPA may not have been derived from the 
patentee or its privities.26  Abandonment of use abandons the defense as well, 
although revival of the use may qualify if the limitations of the Act are met by 
the revived activity, without reliance on the pre-abandonment activities.27  The 
defense may not be transferred unless it is an, “. . .ancillary and subordinate 
part of a good faith assignment or transfer for other reasons of the entire 
enterprise or line of business to which the defense relates.”28  In such cases of 
transferred operations, the defense only applies at those sites at which the 
method is in use.29  “Site” is not defined under the AIPA.30 
Products of processes immunized by Prior User Rights may be bought 
without subjecting the buyer to an infringement action based on the covering 
patent from which the process is immune.  Patent rights subject to the defense 
may not be asserted against the buyer or user of a protected product or service 
generated with use of the defensible method.  “The sale or other disposition of 
a useful end product by a patented method shall exhaust the patent owners 
rights under the patent to the extent such rights would have been exhausted had 
such sale or other disposition been made by the patent owner.”31 
The defendant has the burden of establishing the defense by clear and 
convincing evidence.32  If unsuccessful and without a “reasonable basis for 
asserting the defense” the court “shall” find the case exceptional for awarding 
attorneys fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285.33 
Importantly, the defense is to be asserted on a claim by claim basis.34  The 
defense is “not a general license under all claims of the patent at issue, but 
extends only to the specific subject matter claimed in the patent with respect to 
which the person can assert a defense under this chapter. . .”35  Presumably, the 
non-invalidity provision, which states, “a patent shall not be deemed to be 
invalid under Section 102 or Section 103 of this title solely because a defense 
 
 25. Id. § 273(a)(2)(a) & (b). 
 26. AIPA, § 4302, 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(3)(b) (1999). 
 27. Id. § 273(b)(5). 
 28. Id. § 273(b)(6). 
 29. Id. § 273(b)(7). 
 30. It remains to be seen if the pervasive e-commerce patents, which lie at the heart of the 
Business Method Patent controversy, will be subject to the defense according to the bricks and 
mortar “site” of an e-commerce business office, or the virtual “site” of that business’ URL. 
 31. AIPA, § 4302, 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(2) (1999). 
 32. Id. § 273 (b)(4). 
 33. Id. § 273(b)(8). 
 34. Id. § 273(b)(3)(c). 
 35. Id. 
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is raised or established under this section,”36 will also be applied on a claim by 
claim basis. 
The “First Inventor Defense” has been available in actions begun after 
November 28, 1999.37  There is no provision in the Act mandating an election 
between affirmative defenses, although the prior user rights are clearly 
intended to apply where 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) prior uses have been “suppressed 
and concealed,” which formerly prevented prior trade secrets from invalidating 
later patents. 
B. Applying the Act’s New Defense 
The new Act has been carefully crafted to mesh with the existing statutory 
framework, although that precision in drafting was not achieved in the 
contentious area of defining the breadth of the prior user right.  The defense is 
designed to apply only to trade secrets.38  The method must be reduced to 
practice and in commercial use more than one year before the filing of the 
asserted patent.  If not a trade secret, subject technology would be Section 
102(a) art (known or used), Section 102(b) art (in public use or on sale) or 
Section 102(g) art (made by another).  The Act is further consistent with 
Section 102(g) by containing its own abandonment clause, which vitiates the 
defense, just as abandonment vitiates any opportunity to invalidate an asserted 
patent under Section 102(g).  Hence, the new defense is designed to fit within 
the “suppressed and concealed” exception to Section 102(g) art. 
Although the new defense is expressly intended to protect those who elect 
trade secret protection over patenting,39 the defense does not require that those 
asserting it establish any element of trade secret qualification typically required 
by state law.  If a method is in commercial use it will qualify, whether 
reasonable steps have been implemented to guard its secrecy or not.  It is 
assumed that if the other Section 102 invalidating defenses are available, they 
will be asserted as alternative affirmative defenses.  Hence the body of law that 
will be brought to bear on the issue of whether a defendant’s or third party’s 
 
 36. AIPA, § 4302, 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(9) (1999) (emphasis added).  A logical reading of the 
word “patent” in § 273(b)(9) is that it be in accord with the word “claims” in § 273(b)(3)(c) that 
is, that invalidity is also on a claim by claim basis.  But this would afford defendants the 
tantalizing opportunity to have their cake and eat it too.  Some claims may be defended with Prior 
User Rights, while broader claims may be subject to invalidation attempts under § 102(g) with the 
same technology and record of reduction to practice. 
 37. AIPA, § 4303, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1999). 
 38. If not secret, a § 102(b) bar would apply.  See American Inventors’ Protection Act: 
Hearings on H.R. 1225 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop., 106th Cong. 180 
(1999) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Ronald J. Stern, President Patent Office Professional 
Assoc.). 
 39. See id. at 78, 94 (statement by Michael K. Balmer & Norman Kirk); 145 CONG. REC. 
S13259 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1999) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
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prior practice is a personal (secret) prior use or a invalidating public use will be 
Section 102(g) case law, which is not thoroughly developed.40 
The problems created by the “First Inventor Defense”41 Prior User Right’s 
statute are immediately manifest.  Disclosure is discouraged when secrecy is 
rewarded.  Uncertainty is rife as long as a “method of doing or conducting 
business” remains undefined.  An immediate concern is whether “method” 
broadly means Section 100(b) “process” claiming convention,42 or narrowly 
means Business Method subject matter, like Class 705, whether claimed as an 
apparatus or a method.  If the AIPA is construed broadly as covering Section 
100(b) process claiming, the practitioner faced with suit will be forced into the 
untenable position of arguing that the accused technology is the same as the 
patentee plaintiff’s technology in order to use the safe harbor of Prior User 
Rights, while simultaneously arguing that the technology is different to avoid 
infringing the apparatus claims.  Moreover, if broadly construed, this 
conundrum will be faced even when subject matter clearly within Class 705 is 
in litigation.43 
III.  BACKGROUND 
A. Introduction 
The United States patent system is unique in the world in that it awards 
priority to the first to invent.  Like much in American jurisprudence, the 
substantive justice of applying that principle comes at a cost.  The interference 
system of establishing priority is slow, costly and most frequently awards the 
patent to the first to file anyway.44  The rest of the world awards patents to the 
 
 40. Notably, the date of actual invention is irrelevant to the defense.  The patentee’s filing 
date is compared to the defendant’s date of commercial use.  This promotes certainty for attorney 
clearance opinions regarding issued or published patents. 
 41. It is generally accepted that the “first inventor defense” is a misnomer since use, not 
invention, is the requirement for the defense.  If a first and second user both elect trade secret 
protection, the second user may assert the defense against a third user/first patent applicant, 
although the second user did not invent.  See Hearings, supra note 39, at 180 (statement of 
Ronald J. Stern, President Patent Office Professional Assoc.).  “Prior User Rights” as used in this 
article will refer to the “First Inventor Defense.” 
 42. The definition used in the original draft of the Act, H.R. 1907, 106th Cong. (1999). 
 43. Conversely, it is easy to conceive of a fact pattern where “abandoned, suppressed or 
concealed” are issues of fact and where defense counsel has mixed factual grounds from which he 
could argue that the apparatus claims asserted are invalid for unconcealed § 102(g) art, or the 
method claims are defensible for concealed § 273 art based on the same prior use. 
 44. See Patent Harmonization Act of 1992, Hearings on H.R. 4978-S.2605 Joint Hearings 
Before Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks and the House 
Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop. and Admin., 102nd Cong. 83 (1992) (statement 
by Robert P. Merges), summarized in 44 BNA PAT. TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT J., May 7, 
1992, at 3 [hereinafter Patent Harmonization Act]. 
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first to file and, in most industrial countries, when that results in a potential 
injustice to a prior inventor, that inventor is granted immunity from an 
infringement action through Prior User Rights.  By comparison, the U.S. has 
always had the strongest Prior User Rights in that the system awards the entire 
patent estate, not merely a defense, to the first to invent, provided that the first 
inventor elects to file. 
In application, this system presents an inventor with a choice: disclose and 
patent or protect the technology as a trade secret and risk being enjoined by a 
second comer who patents.45  It is this choice between the vulnerability of 
trade secret protection and the expense of patenting that the advocates of Prior 
User Rights in the United States seek to obviate.  In an increasingly global 
economy, advocates argue that it is unfair for foreign corporations to have 
domestic Prior User Rights insulating them from foreign patents owned by 
U.S. corporations, when U.S. corporations have remained vulnerable to foreign 
owners of U.S. patents who can enjoin domestic corporations’ domestic 
practice of their own technology.46  Patent protection, they argue further, is so 
expensive that protecting all patentable technology is cost prohibitive.47  It is 
common to patent the most valuable technology and conceal as trade secrets 
supportive methods or technology of more marginal value.  Although it does 
not necessarily follow that foreign corporations will incur the expense of 
patenting here in all of the cases where a domestic inventor has elected cheap, 
risky trade secret protection, Prior User Rights advocates quantify their 
position by citing a foreign presence in the U.S. markets of 11%, while 46% of 
U.S. patents are awarded to foreigners.48 
The Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations spurred the 
introduction in 1992 of the Patent Harmonization Act,49 which never passed 
into law.  The prior user right debate was pursued, heard and legislation drafted 
to introduce prior user rights in the United States.  This draft legislation 
included limits on and requirements for asserting the defense, including 
commercial use and the inclusion of technology whose commercial use was 
delayed by the regulatory process. 
While the transactional costs of establishing broad Prior User Rights in the 
first to invent United States patent system is acknowledged, advocates insisted 
that the cost would be justified.  They failed, however, to overcome their 
 
 45. Note that a third choice is to create a “freedom to operate” by publicly disclosing the 
new development. 
 46. See Hearings, supra note 39, at 78, 94 (statement by Michael K. Balmer & Norman 
Kirk). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Hearings, supra note 39, at 225 (statement of National Association of 
Manufacturers).  See also Prior Domestic Commercial Use Act, H.R. 2235, 104th Cong. (1995), 
which also did not pass. 
 49. H.R. 4978, 102nd Cong. (1992); S. 2605, 102nd Cong. (1992). 
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opponents.  Stalemate continued until the advent of the State Street Bank case 
in July 1998.  State Street Bank was anticipated to be the final nail in the coffin 
of Gottshalk v. Benson50 which held that software (computer algorithms) was 
unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.51  The State Street Bank 
court held that as long as software provided “a useful, concrete and tangible 
result[,]”52 it was patentable subject matter.  But the State Street Bank court 
went on to make the unanticipated move of addressing the “exception” from 
patentability of Business Methods.  “We take this opportunity to lay this ill-
conceived exception to rest.”53 
State Street Bank reviewed the case law often cited in support of the 
proposition that Business Methods were unpatentable.  The court found that 
those holdings were based on a straightforward application of Sections 102 and 
103 invalidity arising from the prior art.  Anticipating the law, in 1995 the 
USPTO removed the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) section 
stating that Business Methods were not patentable on subject matter grounds.54 
Following the State Street Bank holding, the USPTO issued a White Paper 
that more thoroughly debunked the myth that any case had denied a business 
method patentability on Section 101 subject matter grounds.55  Despite the fact 
that business method unpatentability was mere dictum, the relevant community 
of practitioners and technology developers had always accepted the “rule” at 
face value.  Whereas the expected holding of State Street Bank regarding the 
patentability of software was an incremental step in a continuum,56 the 
abrogation of the business method exception came as something of a 
revelation.  Coincidentally, the development of the Internet was exploding and 
the already developed body of programming art was being brought to bear 
upon it.  The response to the elimination of the perceived rule against patenting 
 
 50. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 51. A quarter century of caselaw eroding this holding culminated in In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 
1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), which held that it was § 101 subject matter to claim as an 
apparatus a programmed computer, because once programmed a computer was indeed a special 
purpose machine.  State Street was then followed by AT&T v. Excel Communications, 172 F.3d 
1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999), which endorsed method claiming for software. 
 52. State St., 49 F.3d at 1375. 
 53. Id. at 1375. 
 54. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE: REVISION 1 § 706.03(a) (7th ed. 2000) 
[hereinafter MPEP].  See Roberta J. Morris, Some Data About Patents in Class 705, INTELL. 
PROP. TODAY, May 2001, at 51. 
 55. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, at http://www.uspto.gov (last visited May 29, 
2001). 
 56. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix 
Corp, 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992), In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re 
Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994); AT&T v. Excel Communications, 172 F.3d 1352 
(Fed. Cir. 1999).  See also In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A 1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 
758 (C.C.P.A 1980); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A 1982). 
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business methods was sharp and strong.  Applicants rushed to the USPTO to 
file for business method patents, particularly in Class 705.  The stampede may 
prove to be of questionable consequentiality in terms of issued patents, 
especially since many of those applications were destined to be filed anyway, 
given the advent of the Internet.57  However the fact that State Street Bank 
initiated a “race to the Patent Office” with technologies complex (Signature 
Financial’s “Hub and Spoke” Mutual Fund Reconciling Program)58 and simple 
(Amazon’s “One Click” patents)59 is borne out by USPTO statistics.  Class 705 
applications rose from 330 in 1995 to 7,800 in 2000.60 
These applications are considered by many to be for technology applying 
well developed programming techniques that were, to a greater or lesser extent, 
already known or in use.  For a brief and anomalous period, in this limited 
area, the U.S. may fairly be considered to have a de-facto first to file system. 
In spite of the fact that a rule against patenting Business Methods never 
really existed, public debate over the State Street Bank holding has been 
contentious.  Congress, however, took note of this fact.  Fallout from State 
Street Bank proved to be a catalyst for passage of Prior User Rights and it also 
proved to be a successful, if unfinished, ground work for compromise between 
Prior User Rights’ advocates and opponents. 
The framework of the previous Prior User Rights bill was modified to 
become the “first to invent defense” of the American Inventor’s Protection 
Act.  To pass over the objections of opponents, the right was limited to 
Business Methods.61  Surviving from the original legislation are the 
commercial use requirement and a form of the Section 156 regulatory review 
qualification62 and the personal defense limitation.63  Lost to Prior User Rights 
advocates was the broad definition of methods as Section 100(b) processes.64 
In its stead, the present definition passed.  The current law has the architecture 
and the legislative history to support either a broad or narrow definition of “a 
method of doing or conducting business.” 
 
 57. See Morris, supra note 55. 
 58. U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (issued Mar. 9, 1993). 
 59. U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 9, 1999). 
 60. Class 705 applications filed:  330 in 1995; 584 in 1996; 927 in 1997; 1,340 in 1998; 
2,821 in 1999; and 7,800 in 2000.  Class 705 patents issued:  126 in 1995; 144 in 1996; 206 in 
1997; 420 in 1998; 585 in 1999; and 899 in 2000.  See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, supra 
note 56. 
 61. See infra text accompanying notes 144 - 156, for a discussion on legislative history. 
 62. Formerly included as a part of “effective and serious preparation” for commercialization.  
See H.R. 4978, 102nd Cong. (1992); S. 2605, 102nd Cong. § 273 (1992). 
 63. See H.R. 4978, 102nd Cong. (1992); S. 2605, 102nd Cong. § 273 (1992). 
 64. See H.R. 1907, 106th Cong. (1999).  “The term ‘process or method’ means ‘process’ as 
defined in [35 U.S.C.] § 100(b), and includes any invention that produces a useful end product or 
service which has been or could have been claimed in a patent in the form of a process.”  Id. 
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B. Statutory Construction—The Argument For Broad Application Of The 
New Defense 
Prior User Rights advocates argue that basic tenants of statutory 
construction indicate that a broad reading of “method of doing or conducting 
business” is correct.65  First, the language of the statute itself controls, 
particularly when read in context and in view of companion statutory 
provisions,66 and legislative history is to be examined only in situations of 
unresolvable ambiguity.67  Accordingly, advocates argue that the definition of 
“methods” must be Section 100(b) processes, because of the existence in the 
act of the Section 156 allowance that technology under regulatory review may 
qualify as being in commercial use to claim the benefit of the defense.  Since 
such reviews, as by the FDA, are far broader in scope than any conceivable 
review of Internet or financial technology, the AIPA is properly construed as 
equally broad in scope.  Second, advocates argue that the defense is site 
specific and that such a limitation is a fiction for Internet technology.  
Therefore, the AIPA is properly construed in a broad sense, since “site” is 
properly construed as applying to physical plants, where manufacturing 
processes occur.  Finally, Prior User Rights advocates argue that the Act’s 
definition includes methods of “doing or conducting business.”  The presence 
of two words is properly construed as meaning two types of methods are 
intended to be covered; “doing” business methods and “conducting” 
manufacturing processes. 
These arguments may support a broad reading of the AIPA, but they do not 
compel it.  While an application of the regulatory qualification clause of the 
AIPA supports a broad interpretation, ignoring it does not vitiate a narrow 
reading.  Finally, of course, the clause is a modification from the broader 
unrestricted draft of the Harmonization Act,68 which did not pass into law until 
the State Street Bank compromise in 1999.69 
The site specific limitation may be fairly construed as a Unique Resource 
Locator (URL). If the nature and extent of a website’s content and 
functionality are considered to be evanescent, it need only be recalled that the 
burden of proving what functionality existed at an accused website at a given 
time is on the defendant operator of that site, if they intend to use the prior user 
 
 65. The author wishes to acknowledge the generous contributions of Gary Griswold and 
Kent Kokko for sharing Power Point slides and conversations, notwithstanding the positions 
taken in this article. 
 66. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. 120 (2000); Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Medtronic Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990). 
 67. United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
 68. H.R. 4978, 102nd Cong. (1992); S. 2605, 102nd Cong. (1992). 
 69. The Courts may consider the circumstances surrounding passage of legislation.  See Leo 
Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 669 (1979). 
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defense.70 This is no less problematic than the dissection of often 
heterogeneous physical plants to determine if inter-operable processing across 
the hall, across the street, or across town will qualify as a single “site.”  Most 
compelling is the fact that “site” must be construed to mean a website 
(preferably, a URL) if Internet business method patents are to be covered by 
the Act, which is the subject matter all sides agree the Act was meant to cover. 
Finally, the words “doing or conducting” are not further defined or used in 
the AIPA and so their dual presence does not mandate that a separate or broad 
meaning be given to either or both of them.  The language of the statute itself, 
then, does not compel a necessarily broad definition of Business Methods any 
more than it compels a narrow reading.  Accordingly, even under the 
traditional statutory construction rules, the language of the statute is more than 
ambiguous enough for the courts to consider the legislative history as an 
extrinsic interpretation aide.71 
C. Legislative History 
Both the advocates and opponents of Prior User Rights made a record in 
the legislative history that the statue will bear their interpretation of it, either 
narrow or broad.  In the Committee Reports, hearings, sponsor statements, 
history of legislative inaction and circumstances surrounding the introduction 
and passage of the bill, support can be found for both the broad and a narrow 
interpretation of the meaning of “methods of doing or conducting business.”  
While disparate language appears, when taken as a whole the legislative 
history clearly shows a consensus that the new defense be available to 
substantive, Class 705 type, Business Methods.  There is no such consensus 
that the new defense apply more broadly than that. 
D. Committee Reports 
Statements in Committee Reports are generally considered authoritative 
and are given great weight.72  The Committee Report from the House begins: 
Title II strikes an equitable balance between the interest of U.S. inventors who 
have invented and commercialized business methods and processes, many of 
which until recently were not patentable, and later U.S. or foreign inventors 
who have patented the processes . . .  
 
 70. AIPA, § 4302, 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(4) (1999). 
 71. See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982). 
 72. See Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of 
Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 304 (1982) (estimating that 
over 60% of the Supreme Courts cites to legislative history over a forty year period were to 
Committee Reports); but see Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989) (Scalia, J. dissenting) 
(noting the effect that particular constituencies make statements advocating their positions in 
Committee Reports, whose details are seldom seen by all the House members enacting the bill). 
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The title clarifies the interface between two key branches of intellectual 
property law—patents and trade secrets.  Patent law serves the public interest 
by encouraging innovation and investment in new technology, and may be 
thought of as providing a right to exclude other parties from an invention in 
return for the inventor making a public disclosure of the invention.  Trade 
secret law, however, also serves the public interest by protecting investments 
in new technology.  Trade secrets have taken on a new importance with an 
increase in the ability to patent all business methods and processes.  It would 
be administratively and economically impossible to expect any inventor to 
apply for a patent on all business methods and processes now deemed 
patentable.  In order to protect inventors and to encourage proper disclosure, 
this title is limited to business methods and processes only.73 
Interestingly, while the above quoted language from the Committee report 
remained intact, the House version of the Bill included the broad definition of 
methods retained from the earlier Harmonization Act.  “(3) process or method 
means processes as defined in Section 100(b) of the Patent Act and includes 
inventions that were or could have been in a patent in the form of a 
process . . . ”74 
i. Broad View 
Broad interpretation advocates point to the following language from the 
report to support their position: 
Subsection (b)(3) creates limitations and qualifications on the use of the 
defense.  First, a person may not assert the defense unless the invention for 
which the defense is asserted is for a business process or method, the exclusive 
purpose of which is to produce a useful end product or service; that is, the 
defense will not be available if the subject matter itself is a useful end product 
or service that constitutes one or more claims of the patent . . . . 
[T]he right to assert the defense can not be licensed, assigned or transferred . . . 
 . . .to illustrate, a person is lawfully entitled to assert the defense as it relates to 
the operation of a specific piece of machinery.  The person owns several other 
pieces of machinery that perform distinct functions which, taken together 
comprise the person’s business.  That person may not transfer the defense as it 
relates to the specific piece of machinery to a third party unless the entire 
commercial establishment is transferred as well.75 
The distinction from end products and the references to machinery support 
broad interpretation of methods as including manufacturing methods. 
The report, however, also contains limiting language. In addition to that 
found in the introductory remarks quoted above, the report also says: 
 
 73. H.R. REP NO. 106-287, at 44-45 (1999). 
 74. H.1907, 106th Cong. (1999) (original draft). 
 75. H.R. REP. NO. 106-287, at 48-49 (1999). 
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An invention is considered to be a process or method if it is used in connection 
with the production of a useful end product or service and is or could have 
been claimed in the form of a business process or a method in a patent.  A 
software related invention, for example that was claimed by the patent 
draftsman as a programmed machine when the same invention could have been 
protected with process or method patent claims is a process or method for 
purposes of Section 273.76 
This statement that substance will prevail over the claiming form means 
that “methods of doing or conducting business” must be a subject matter 
definition, i.e. Class 705 Business Methods, and not a patent claim form 
definition.  If this were not so, this clause would mean that almost all claims to 
all apparatuses, which almost always include method claims,77 would be 
covered by the Prior User Right, whether a “business” method or otherwise.  
This, of course, is the Prior User Rights advocates’ intended result, but is not 
what opponents agreed to in passing the bill. 
ii. Limited View 
Other language in the Committee Report supporting a limited 
interpretation of the definition includes: 
Accordingly, “arms length commercial transfer of a product or service” under 
proposed Section 273 includes the use of an invention for a process or method, 
the subject matter of which may be directed to an information or data 
processing system providing a financial service.  These financial services may 
embody business methods or processes incorporated into any number of 
systems including, but not limited to, trading, investment and liquidity 
management, securities, custody and reporting, balance reporting, funds 
transfer, ACH, ATM process, on-line banking, check processing, and 
compliance in risk management.  In each of these systems, multiple processing 
and methods steps are acting upon a customer’s data without its knowledge.78 
This description of what is commonly and historically understood to be the 
core of Business Method Patenting is immediately followed by a Committee 
Report endorsement of the historical context in which this act was passed: 
In the past, many of the financial institutions that developed and used such 
systems did so in a climate where trade secret protection was believed to be the 
only practical legal protection available.  Under established law, these pre-
existing systems do not now qualify for patent protection because they have 
been in commercial use for some time, albeit in secret.  Such secret or 
“concealed” use may not prevent another, later inventor from obtaining patent 
 
 76. Id. at 46. 
 77. It is common among practitioners to draft claims “covering” an invention in all forms 
possible.  See generally FABER LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING (Pat. L. 
Inst. ed., 4th ed. 1998). 
 78. H.R. REP. NO. 106-287, at 47 (1999). 
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protection that would bar the earlier developer and user from continuing to use 
the business processes and methods that are her earlier inventions and that may 
have been in use for years or even decades.79 
This narrative is a clear reference to the 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) limitation that prior 
art that has been “abandoned, suppressed or concealed” by its owner may not 
serve to invalidate a patent later issued to a second comer to the technology. 
E. Hearings And Floor Debates 
Statements in hearing and floor debates receive less deference than do 
Committee reports.  Witnesses and Congressmen frequently use such 
opportunities to advocate positions opposed to one another or even opposed to 
the draft legislation.  Moreover, statements in debate may be amended or 
supplemented in the published version of the Congressional Record after 
legislators have voted.80  Nevertheless, the Courts are entitled to consider such 
testimony.81The advocates of a broad reading of “methods of doing or 
conducting business” use the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on 
Courts and Intellectual Property Hearings, presided over by Representative 
Coble, to make their case. 
i. Broad View 
Michael K. Kirk, executive director of the American Intellectual Property 
Law Association, in endorsing the Prior User Rights section of the bill made 
arguments that also support a broad interpretation of “methods of doing or 
conducting business” to include manufacturing processes: 
There are a number of reasons why it is not feasible or even possible to patent 
every invention which could be patented.  First and foremost are costs.  The 
costs of seeking and obtaining patent protection in the United States are high.  
These costs, as well as the costs of enforcing patents in this country, have 
become so high that U.S. companies, regardless of size, must carefully 
prioritize which inventions they seek to patent.  These costs fall even more 
heavily on smaller U.S. firms, and especially on independent inventor-
innovators, who are frequently limited to patenting only their most important 
inventions.82 
Industrial process technology presents another difficult dilemma for its 
creators.  Identifying a competitor’s use of a patented process can be extremely 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping Into Legislative History, 11 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125 (1983). 
 81. NORMAN J. SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 
48.13 (4th ed. 1984). 
 82. It is argued by more than a few that Prior User Rights benefit large corporations far more 
than individuals.  See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 39, at 213 (statement of Gabrial P. Katona). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
260 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:245 
difficult in the United States and virtually impossible in foreign countries.  
Even if obtaining patents in the United States and abroad were economically 
feasible, the patent’s disclosure of the process presents a significant risk to the 
patentee in the United States and foreign markets.  Especially in the case of 
products made abroad and imported into the United States, it is very difficult to 
prove that the products were made by a particular process that infringes a 
patent in the United States or the country of origin. 
For these and other practical reasons, many U.S. companies and especially 
smaller U.S. companies are forced to forego patenting of many inventions.  In 
the case of Industrial Process Technology and certain manufacturing 
equipment, these companies seek to protect their technology under trade secret 
laws.  Because patents may not completely protect such technology, and 
because infringement by others which occurs within the confines of their own 
factories is virtually undetectable, disclosing such technology through patents 
is not the best way to protect it.  Practicing the technology in secret is more 
effective.  This creates the possibility that a second, later U.S. or foreign 
inventor may obtain a U.S. patent on technology already being commercially 
used, but which has not been publicly disclosed.  This later inventing U.S. or 
foreign holder of a U.S. patent could then obtain an injunction and prevent the 
U.S. manufacture from further use of the invention, even though the U.S. 
manufacturer has the made the benefits of the invention available to the public 
through its commercial trade secret use of the invention.83 
Although not in the legislative history, the AIPLA has made its position clear 
in a White Paper: 
The AIPLA recommends that the first inventor defense be applied to all 
commercialized methods without regard to the technologies in which they are 
implemented or to the formats in which they are claimed.  To the extent that 
this is not clear from the language of the statute and the legislative history, the 
statute should be revised.84 
At the Committee hearings Norman Balmer, president of the Intellectual 
Property Owners, stated: 
The first to invent defense in the Committee print preserves trade secrets that 
are the life blood of American manufacturing and service companies. . . . 
It can take years and millions of dollars to engineer and construct a 
manufacturing plant using new technology or producing a new product. . . . 
Inventions such as manufacturing processes often can be protected most 
effectively against copying by U.S. competitors by keeping them as trade 
 
 83. Id. at 104. 
 84. Patenting Business Methods: A White Paper of the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association, adopted Nov. 27, 2000 (citing AIPLA Motion in Support of S.2272 (July 14, 1994)), 
available at http://www.aipla.org/html/whatsnew/patentingbusiness2.pdf (last visited June 20, 
2001). 
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secrets instead of obtaining a U.S. patent.  Moreover, U.S. patents can be a 
blueprint for foreign competitors to steal technology.85 
Interestingly, both Kirk and Balmer backed up their statements by arguing the 
impact of State Street: 
This decision will have significant ramifications.  By December 1998 the 
Patent and Trademark Office reported a 40% increase in patent applications for 
business method software.  Firms in the financial industry that developed and 
commercially used business methods in secret before 1998 are foreclosed from 
obtaining their own patents because of their own prior commercial use 
(35 U.S.C. § 102(b)).  Yet, later developers of the same methods can now 
obtain a U.S. patent.  [The first inventor defense] will make more certain the 
validity of newly filed “business method” patents while allowing prior 
inventors the ability to continue serving the public interest in their business. 
In summary, the first to invent defense is essential to protect and encourage 
business investments and manufacturing its services and prevent a costly give 
away of American know-how to foreign competitors through patent inventions 
that are better protected by secrecy.86 
Kirk stated: 
This [State Street] decision put to rest the notion that “methods of doing 
business” were not patentable subject matter.  Thus, many businesses that 
eschewed seeking patents for similar subject matter may now find that the 
techniques they have used as trade secrets in their daily operations are being 
patented by others, putting them in considerable risk.87 
Thus, although these advocates of the Bill are also advocates of a broad 
interpretation of it and had been advocates of across the board Prior User 
Rights in earlier draft legislation, they argued their points by making 
statements regarding the State Street Bank decision that are consistent with a 
narrow interpretation of the definition of “methods of doing or conducting 
business,” although that was clearly not the intent of these witnesses at the 
hearings. 
There is good reason for the testimony of Balmer and Kirk not more 
directly addressing the issue of the breadth of the definition of “methods of 
doing or conducting business.”  The draft of the Bill at the time of their 
testimony still defined methods as Section 100(B) processes.  It was only after 
the March 26, 1999 hearing that the draft was amended to limit the defense to 
“methods of doing or conducting business.”  Representative Rohrabacher, in a 
May 5, 1999 fact sheet, said that “[t]he rationale for the more narrowly tailored 
defense is to address the precedent set forth by State Street Bank.  That case 
 
 85. Hearings, supra note 39, at 86. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 106. 
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gave patent protection to data processing systems and eliminated the business 
method exception to patentability.”88 
At the end of the hearing a letter from the National Association of 
Manufacturers written on April 5, 1999 was read into the record.  The letter 
argued that the Prior User Rights would not decrease the disclosure of 
technology which the patent laws seek to incentivize, because “this statutory 
defense could only come into play after one party had been granted a patent, 
with its intended public disclosure.”89  This of course does not take into 
account that the patent laws are designed to incentivize the original inventor to 
disclose his technology.90 
The letter goes on to make the more persuasive argument that under the 
current system the result of litigation between a second comer/patentee and a 
first inventor/trade secret user of the technology is harsh: a “death sentence” 
for either the trade secret or the patent, referring to Section 102(g).91 
ii. Limited View 
Even before Congressman Rohrabacher’s comments, the Committee 
Hearings contained statements consistent with the narrow construction of Prior 
User Rights.  In questioning the passage of a Prior User Rights bill at all, 
Representative Tom Campbell from California stated: 
I have checked with as many high tech companies as I can . . . [they] said that 
this undermines the whole idea of encouraging people to file for a patent…. 
The rebuttal is very strong.  The rebuttal says, for heaven sake.  That is what 
you get for not patenting it.  The idea here is to get people to patent so that it is 
not secret.  If you allow an exception, which your bill does in title II for a prior 
commercial use, I think it undermines that incentive in an important way.92 
This invocation of disclosure encouragement as the time honored way to 
achieve the constitutional mandate of “promoting the progress of the useful 
arts”93 is further developed in the comments of Representative Rohrabacher 
from California: 
As I have always held, due to the constitutional issues and Supreme Court 
precedent, we simply cannot champion trade secret protection over patent 
protection for clearly patentable subject matter.  We cannot betray our 
founding fathers by abandoning the foundation upon which our patent system 
 
 88. BNA’S PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., May 27, 1999, at 101. 
 89. Hearings, supra note 39, at 222. 
 90. Id.  Of course this raises a useful topic for quantitative study:  Are more patent 
applications filed, and disclosures made, if a series of “inventors” are given the opportunity for a 
valid patent, instead of just the first? 
 91. Id. at 225. 
 92. Id. at 14. 
 93. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8. 
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is based.  We cannot allow state based rights to trump long standing federally 
created intellectual property rights.  We cannot openly advocate secrecy when 
our patent system calls for us to vigorously promote the progress of science 
through the sharing of critical technology information. 
With that said, however, all is not lost.  Perhaps there is a way in the context of 
an overall agreement that I could support a narrow application of a first to 
invent defense.94 
Representative Rohrabacher then went on to endorse the Bill’s limitations on 
the availability of the defense, without specifically addressing the definition of 
methods of doing business. 
F. House Floor Debate 
Hence, all partisans both in favor of and opposed to a broad application of 
Prior User Rights made statements at the House Committee Hearings that 
would support both narrow and broad definitions of methods of doing or 
conducting business.  The most accurate and candid summation of the 
legislative history in the House was made by the subcommittee chairman, 
Congressman Coble, in response to a question from Congressman Lofgren 
from California about the extent of the impact of the Bill: 
Mr. Speaker, it is limited, I say to the gentlewoman from California, to the 
State Street Bank case.  There was some discussion early on that perhaps the 
first inventor defense should apply to processes as well as methods.  But we 
finally concluded that we would restrict it to methods only, and that, by having 
done that, we were able to satisfy some folks who were opposed to the Bill 
otherwise.95 
On August 3, 1999, Representative Rohrabacher went on to say: 
Instead of a prior user defense that applies to all inventions . . . HR 1907 
contains a very limited prior user defense that applies only to those business 
methods which have only been considered patentable in the last few years, and 
this, of course, flows from an adverse case before the Court that changed the 
patent law.96 
On August 4, 1999, HR 1907 passed the House by a 376 to 43 vote.  After the 
amendment, comments on the breadth of the “methods” to which the defense 
would apply became even more pointedly divisive. 
 
 94. Hearings, supra note 39, at 22. 
 95. 145 CONG. REC. H6942 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999) (statement of Rep. Cobble), reprinted in 
BNA’S PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., Aug. 5, 1999, at 425.  According to Senator Hatch’s 
Introductory Remarks, “[t]his legislation is the product of several years of discussion and 
extensive efforts to reach agreement on a responsible package of patent reforms.”  Id. 
 96. 145 CONG. REC. H6943 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1999) (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher). 
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i. Broad View 
Some of the Senate’s section by section analysis of S. 1948 indicates the 
defense is not limited to the facts of the State Street Bank case: 
To be “commercially used” or in “commercial use” for purposes of Subsection 
A, the use must be in connection with either an internal commercial use or an 
actual arms length sale or other arms length commercial transfer of a useful 
end result.  The method that is the subject matter of the defense may be an 
internal method for doing business, such as an internal human resources 
management process, or a method for conducting business such as a 
preliminary or intermediate manufacturing procedure, which contributes to 
the effectiveness of the business by producing a useful end result for the 
internal operation of the business or for external sale.  Commercial use does 
not require the subject matter at issue to be accessible to or otherwise known to 
the public.97 
On November 19, Senator Charles Schumer said, “[t]he defense will be 
applicable against method claims as claims involving machines or other 
articles the manufacturer used to practice such methods.”98Furthermore, 
Representative Jerrold Nadler of New York stated that, “[t]he first inventor 
defense is intended to protect both method claims and apparatus claims.”99 
ii. Narrow View 
In his remarks introducing the Bill in the Senate, Senator Hatch said: 
The Bill responds to recent changes in PTO practice and the Federal Circuit’s 
1998 decision in State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial 
Group, 149 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998), in which it formally did away with the 
so called “business methods” exception to statutory patentable subject matter.  
As a result, patent filings for business methods are up by 75% this year, and 
many who have been using business methods for many years pursuant to trade 
secret protection—believing such methods were not patentable—are now faced 
with potential patent infringement suits from others who, while they may have 
come later to the game, were the first to reach the Patent Office after the bar to 
patentability for business methods was lifted.100 
The legislative history makes it clear that there is a consensus that the prior 
user defense applies to substantive business methods such as those typified by 
Class 705 and State Street.  No such consensus exists for broader application 
of the defense. 
 
 97. 145 CONG REC. S1471 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1999) (emphasis added), reprinted in BNA’S 
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., Nov. 25, 1999, at 189-90. 
 98. 145 CONG. REC. S6942 (daily ed. Nov. 11, 1999) (statement of Sen. Schumer). 
 99. 145 CONG. REC. H12805 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1999) (statement of Rep. Nadler). 
 100. 145 CONG. REC. S13259 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1999) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
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G. Substance Over Form 
Probably the most useful quote from the legislative history is from 
Chairman Coble: 
The issue of whether an invention is a method is to be determined based on its 
underlying nature and not on the technicality of the form of the claims in the 
patent.  For example, a method for doing or conducting business that has been 
claimed in a patent as a programmed machine, as in the State Street case, is a 
method for purposes of Section 273 if the invention could have as easily been 
claimed as a method.  Form should not rule over substance.101 
This statement is in accord with the case law.  In the long struggle over 
software patentability that ultimately lifted the bar on Business Method 
patenting as well, distinctions between method claims and machine claims 
were discounted in the final analysis.  In AT&T v. Excel Communications the 
court held, “[w]e consider the scope of Section 101 to be the same regardless 
of the form—machine or process—in which a particular claim is drafted.”102  
In In Re Allappat, Judge Rader, in his concurring opinion, writes, “Judge Rich, 
with whom I fully concur, reads Allappat’s application as claiming a machine.  
In fact, whether the invention is a process or a machine is irrelevant.”103  In 
State Street Bank the court held, “for the purposes of a Section 101 analysis, it 
is of little relevance whether claim 1 is directed to a machine or 
process . . . . . . .”104  The AT&T court concluded that: 
[T]he Supreme Court’s decisions in Diehr, Benson, and Flook, all of which 
involve method (i.e. process) claims, have provided and supported the 
principles which we apply to both machine and process type claims.  Thus, we 
are comfortable in applying our reasoning in Allappat and State Street to the 
method claims at issue in this case.105 
This refusal to consider an artificial and problematic distinction in Section 
101 analysis should be, as Congressman Coble indicated, applied to prior use 
analysis.  This will avoid tortuous claim drafting by practitioners attempting to 
avoid or invoke the two different sets of rights that the recent legislation has 
created.  Rejecting such an artificial distinction will also avoid the prospect of 
putting defendants in the position of arguing that their technology is the same 
as plaintiff patentee’s technology for purposes of invoking the defense on the 
method claims, while simultaneously arguing that the machine which performs 
the method is different than the plaintiff’s technology to avoid infringing the 
apparatus claims. 
 
 101. 145 CONG. REC. H6942 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1999) (statement of Rep. Coble).  See also 
Senate section by section analysis of S.1948. 
 102. AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1450. 
 103. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1581. 
 104. State St., 149 F.3d at 1372. 
 105. AT&T, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1451. 
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Since the law, the legislature and logic all dictate that substance shall 
control over claim drafting form, it can be seen that the original draft definition 
of “methods” as Section 100(b) processes would, in practical application, 
affect across the board Prior User Rights for all technology, exclusive only of 
articles of manufacture and compositions of matter.  This may be what Prior 
User Rights advocates intended.  It may also be what ultimately happens with 
this statute.  If the legislature does not again intervene to define the scope of 
Prior User Rights, this statute may later be interpreted by the courts, just as 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act was later interpreted by the courts to be broad 
in scope.106  The following question remains: Does the tautological definition 
of business methods passed into law also represent the germination of an 
exception that could swallow the rule? 
IV.  TOWARDS A MORE PRECISE DEFINITION 
Broadly applied, Prior User Rights represent a fundamental change in the 
architecture of the United States patent system.  Prior scholarly and legislative 
debate has been closely contested.107  Accordingly, this subject deserves 
plenary consideration and debate in the legislature, as opposed to the eleventh 
hour compromise that produced the ambiguous “first inventor defense.”108 
Limited legislation has already been introduced suggesting a sharper 
definition of “Business Methods” as: 
 
1. a method of—(a) administering, managing, or otherwise operating an 
enterprise or organization, including a technique used in doing or 
conducting business; or (b) processing financial data; 
2. any technique used in athletics, instruction, or personal skills; and 
3. any computer-assisted implementation of a method described in 
paragraph 1 or a technique described in paragraph 2.109 
 
 
 106. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), Lanham Act § 43(a).  The scope of the ban on false advertising 
took decades to reach its full breadth as courts and practitioners expanded it.  See DONALD 
CHISUM, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, Section 6E[1]. 
 107. See Harmonization Act Hearings, supra note 43; see also Harriel, supra note 1; 
Brownlee, supra note 1; Frank Robbins & Karl Jorda, The Rights of the First Inventor – Trade 
Secret User as Against Those of the Second Inventor-Patentee, 61 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 575 (1979); 
Robert L. Rohyback, Prior User Rights: Roses or Thorns?, 2 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1 
(1993); Griswold, supra note 2, at 233; Griswold & Ubel, supra note 2, at 567: . 
 108. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the relative merits of the debate over 
broadly applied prior user rights.  Rather, this article is directed towards anticipating an 
appropriate and workable definition of the methods to which the first inventor defense of the 
American Inventors Protection Act should apply. 
 109. Business Method Patent Improvement Act, H.R. 1332, 107th Cong. (2001); see also 
Further Hearings of Business Method Patents Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, the 
Internet and Intellectual Prop., 2001 WL 333922 (F.D.C.H.). 
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Short of legislation breaking the decade old stalemate over prior user rights, 
efforts will need to be directed towards defining the scope of the current 
defense.  It will be helpful to consider information from the following sources 
to discern the public policies articulated on the subject of prior trade secret use: 
the USPTO classification system, the history of the “Business Method” case 
law, and the case law interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). It will be seen that those 
policies promote disclosure of technology and, separately, promote to the 
extent possible, certainty and predictability of the patent system for those who 
develop technology and invest in it.  Finally, the nature of current patents on 
Business Methods will be considered in light of those policies. 
A. The USPTO Classification System 
The first step in determining whether or not an asserted patent is subject to 
Prior User Rights or not will be to determine whether or not the patent in 
question is classified as a Business Method. This section will briefly review 
how the USPTO classifies patent applications. 
The USPTO has authority to maintain the classification of patents by 
subject matter.110  Classification has heretofore been directed towards 
administrative purposes and maintaining a database of patents that may be 
efficiently searched.  Under the new AIPA, exercise of that authority will 
generate classifications that will be presumptively valid and subject to review 
as a matter of law.  Hence, although not entitled to interpret the law, the 
USPTO may elect to take the initiative of enumerating those classes considered 
to be Business Methods to which the defense would apply, thereby giving 
some limited guidance to applicants and potential applicants.  Indeed, that 
guidance would be mandated under the proposed Business Method Patent 
Improvement Act.111 
Generally, patents are classified principally in terms of their utility.  The 
focus is upon the function, effect or product of a process or apparatus.  The 
primary criterion is the most comprehensive claim; that is, the most narrow, 
independent claim.112  If two or more claims are comprehensive enough for 
original classification, as for example an apparatus claim and a method claim, 
selection between them is next based on priority of statutory category of 
invention. The patent is placed in the class providing for the claimed category 
that appears highest in the following list: 
 
 
 110. 35 U.S.C. § 8 (1999). 
 111. H.R. 5364, 106th Cong. § 321(b)(1)(B) (2000). 
 112. See EXAMINER’S HANDBOOK TO THE U.S. PATENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM, Chapter 
IV, Determination of Class for Original Classification.  U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce, Development 
and Use of Patent Classification Sys., Lib. Of Cong. Catalog No. 65-62235, at viii (1996). 
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 1. Process (of using product 2, e.g., using a fuel or radio transmitter) 
2. Product (of manufacture, e.g., a fuel or radio transmitter) 
3. Process (of making product 2) 
4. Apparatus (to perform 3 or to make 2, e.g., machine, tool, etc.) 
5. Materials (used in 3 to make 2) 
 
If selection is still not clear, placement is next determined by considering the 
highest category below that provides for claimed subject matter: 
1. Relating to maintenance or preservation of life 
2. Chemical subject matter 
3. Electrical subject matter 
4. Mechanical subject matter 
 a. Dynamic (relates to moving things or combinations of relatively 
moving parts) 
 b. Static (stationary things or parts nonmoveably related)113 
 
Classification criteria are directed towards the “proximate” effect on a 
process.114  The proximate effect is the immediate output of a process, as 
opposed to the overall output of the process as it may be applied to various 
industries.  For example, a process may proximately cause pasteurization and 
would be classified as such, as opposed to being classified as a process for 
producing milk or beer. 
Claims are taken as they are read, in light of the disclosure.  “Any attempt 
of a post classifier to go behind the record and decide the case upon what is 
deemed to be the “real invention” would, it is believed, introduce more errors 
than such action would cure.”115  When the application is received by the 
USPTO, it is routed through the office of Initial Patent Examination where an 
initial classification decision is made by classifiers who are not experts in any 
particular field.116  Thereafter, it is the duty of the examiner117 to review the 
classification propriety, and also the supervisory patent examiner to review 
proper classification.  Transfer procedures for reclassification through a “post 
classifier” are spelled out at MPEP Section 903.08(d).  The patent may be 
reclassified at allowance.118 
 
 113. Id.  See also MPEP, supra note 55, at § 903.07. 
 114. EXAMINER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 114, at Chapter I. 
 115. MPEP, supra note 55, at § 908.08(e)(3). 
 116. Id. §903.08(a). 
 117. Id. § 903.07. 
 118. Id.  Although proper classification is assumed, it is also a valid premise that practitioners 
will have the acumen and motivation to style and manipulate applications either within or without 
a classification that may invoke prior user rights.  For an example of this kind of artful drafting, 
see U.S. Patent No. 4,346,442 (issued Oct. 10, 1980) to Musmanno for a “securities brokerage-
cash management system.”  This patent on a software implemental business method was issued in 
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The USPTO Manual of U.S. Patent Classification defines Class 705 as 
“data processing: financial, business practice, management or cost/price 
determination.”119  The Class currently lists about one hundred subclasses, 
from scheduling to postage metering.120  About thirty related classes are listed 
thereunder as suggested areas for an examiner to search for prior art.  These 
other classes, for example time measurement, control systems or electrical 
computers for calculating, may also come to be reasonably understood as 
encompassing “methods of doing or conducting business.”121 
B. The History Of The Business Method Exception 
The genesis of the “new” business patent rule is in the line of cases 
establishing the patentability of software.  This line of cases demonstrates the 
importance of software implementation in execution of business methods. 
In 1994 the Federal Circuit criticized earlier rulings that software’s 
mathematical algorithms were not patentable subject matter, because 
arithmetic is a subset of the “natural laws” exception to patentability.  In re 
Allappat held that a general purpose computer when programmed by software 
became a special purpose computer which qualified as a machine and brought 
it within the scope of the subject matter encompassed by 35 U.S.C. § 101.  In 
order to do so, the court’s opinion rewrote the method claims of the rejected 
Allappat patent application into apparatus claims.  The court ruled that a 
computing machine that produced a practical, tangible and useful 
transformation of data was a machine that could properly be patented under 
Section 101, provided it was also new under Section 102, non-obvious under 
Section 103 and properly disclosed under § 112. 
The USPTO had always resisted patenting of pure software.  Traditional 
industrial applications incorporating computer technology were issued patents 
pursuant to Diamond v. Diehr.122  In 1996 the USPTO finally capitulated and 
issued its guidelines for patenting of computer-related inventions.123  They also 
eliminated from the MPEP the language in Section 706.03(a) indicating that 
“Business Methods” were not a statutory category for patentability.  
Nevertheless, patent validity for software executing pure transformations of 
data was contested by litigants based not only upon its nature as a pure 
“mathematical algorithm” but also on the basis that it was unpatentable as a 
business method. 
 
1982, long before either software or business methods per se were deemed to be patentable 
subject matter by the Courts or USPTO. 
 119. See supra note 6. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. 450 U.S. 175 (1980) (a rubber mold).  See also Arrythmia v. Corazonix, 958 F.2d 1053 
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (a medical diagnostic instrument). 
 123. 61 Fed. Reg. 7478-92 (1996). 
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The idea that Business Methods were excluded from patentability under 
Section 101 was a rule more honored in its avoidance than its application.  The 
exception originated in Hotel Security Checking, Co. vs. Lorraine, Co.  The 
court stated that a “system of transacting business, apart from means for 
carrying it out, is not within the purview of [patent protection] . . . nor is an 
abstract idea or theory, regardless of its importance, apart from means for 
carrying such ideas or theories into effect, patentable subject matter.”  The 
Business Method there in question was a system of creating accounts for hotel 
employees and waiters to suppress pilferage.  The accounts were debited for 
meals taken and credited for payment for those meals.  The “rule” against 
patentability of Business Methods, however, was mere dicta.  The court based 
its holding on the fact that such a business method was not novel. 
In the following cases, the Business Method “exception” was deliberately 
not addressed in favor of holdings based upon novelty and non-obviousness: In 
re Wait,124 Application of Howard,125 Dann v. Johnson,126 and Paine Webber v. 
Merrill Lynch.127  Additionally, academic review has failed to find a holding 
squarely based upon a “business method exception” to statutory 
patentability.128 
i. The State Street Decision 
In State Street Bank the Federal Circuit considered the validity of a patent 
covering a computer system for controlling financial operations.  The software-
implemented business method in question was a partnership of mutual funds 
created for tax benefits and administrative efficiencies.  An investment was 
made in developing software that could accurately and promptly calculate 
share prices to each shareholder in each of the participating funds after 
calculating each day’s fluctuations in share price, number of shares sold, 
number of shares bought and shareholders entering and leaving funds.  This 
“hub and spoke” method of properly transforming the relevant data was 
challenged in district court as being outside of statutory subject matter because 
it was a mathematical algorithm and also because it was a business method. 
Patent owner Signature Financial had originally filed twelve claims, six 
apparatus claims and six method claims.  It withdrew the method claims under 
the examiner’s threat of Section 101 subject matter rejection of them.  In 
construing the six apparatus claims, the district court read them as actually 
 
 124. 73 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A 1934) 
 125. 394 F.2d 869 (C.C.P.A 1968), 
 126. 425 U.S. 219 (1976) (holding that a computer automated check record keeping system 
was invalid because it was obvious in light of the prior art, not because it was excepted as a 
business method). 
 127. 564 F. Supp. 1358 (Del. 1983). 
 128. See Rinaldo del Gallo, Are Methods of Doing Business Finally Out of Business As a 
Statutory Rejection?, 38 IDEA 403 (1998). 
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being directed to a process.  Since the Alappat case had only authorized 
apparatus claims as statutory subject matter, the district court held the redrawn 
“method” claims invalid as not being drawn to statutory subject matter, both in 
its capacity as a mathematical algorithm process and as a business method. 
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the claims were properly drawn 
as apparatus claims and reading in the requisite data structures from the 
specification under Section 112(6).  The State Street Bank court stated in dicta 
that, for purposes of Section 101 analysis, “it is of little relevance whether 
claim 1 is directed to a ‘machine’ or a ‘process.’”129  It held that the hub and 
spoke software was statutory subject matter because it produced a “useful, 
concrete and tangible result.”  The Court stated: 
We hold that the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, 
by a machine through a series of a mathematical calculations into a final share 
price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, 
or calculation, because it produces a ‘useful, concrete and tangible result’ – a 
final share price momentarily fixed for recording and reporting purposes and 
even accepted and relied upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent 
trades.130 
Finally, the Federal Circuit considered the Business Method exception as 
grounds for holding the patent invalid as non-statutory subject matter.  It 
stated, “we take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to rest.”131  
The Court reviewed the history of the relevant case law, as above, and 
concluded that the exception had never actually been invoked by the Court. 
The Court’s holding is rightfully understood to authorize patent protection 
for computer implemented business applications, including not only software 
but electronic commerce.  According to the court, the patent claim in question 
was “. . .directed to a machine programmed with the hub and spoke software 
which admittedly produces a ‘useful, concrete and tangible result.’  This 
renders it statutory subject matter, even if the useful result is expressed in 
numbers, such as a price, profit, percentage, cost or loss.”132 
ii. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc. 
On April 14, 1999 the Federal Circuit ruled in AT&T Corp. vs. Excel 
Communications, Inc.133  Although validity was not challenged as a business 
method, but as a mathematical algorithm, the court emphatically reaffirmed the 
holding in State Street Bank.  It also expanded the principles stated in State 
Street Bank, holding that the form of the claim, as a method or apparatus, does 
 
 129. State St., 149 F.3d at 1375 (emphasis added). 
 130. State St., 149 F.3d at 1375. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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not matter.  “Whether stated implicitly or explicitly, we consider the scope of 
Section 101 to be the same regardless of the form—machine or process—in 
which a particular claim is drafted.”134 
The court also put to rest the “physical transformation” test, another 
remnant of the court’s quarter century long struggle with software patent 
validity under Section 101.  No physical transformation is required; a 
transformation of data is adequate.  The court stated, “. . .the mere fact that a 
claimed invention involves inputting numbers, calculating numbers, outputting 
numbers and storing numbers, in and of itself, would not render it nonstatutory 
subject matter, unless, of course, its operation does not produce a useful, 
concrete and tangible result.”135 
Even more important than the court’s clear holding is the substance of the 
matter ruled upon.  The patent involved the administration of discounts that 
long distance telephone carriers offered when both the caller and the recipient 
of the call are customers of the same long-distance company.  Each long 
distance call travels with a data packet which, when displayed, has a number of 
data fields including the identity of the caller, the identity of the person called 
and the length of the call.  This “message record” is a useful place to display 
whether or not the caller and recipient qualify for a discount by subscribing to 
the same long distance carrier.  Accordingly, AT&T’s method patent was to 
first, generate this message record as to whether or not both parties to the call 
subscribe to the same long distance carrier and second, display that in the 
record.  The patent was declared valid, summary judgment was reversed and 
AT&T allowed to pursue its damages, including lost profits and injunction, 
against its telecommunications competitor, Excel, based on a simple two-step 
method claim.136 Interestingly, the AT&T patent is classed under 
telecommunications, not Business Methods.137 
 
 134. Id. at 1374. 
 135. Id. 
 136. A separate controversial subject is the validity of the patents that are being issued by the 
USPTO currently.  The director of technology examiners group 2700, responsible for data 
processing applications, readily admits that he is understaffed.  Further, the primary source of 
prior art examined by the USPTO is, in general, its own database of items already patented, that 
is, Section 102(e) art.  Since the USPTO has not been issuing patents on “pure” software (as 
distinguished from traditional patent subject matter such as rubber molds or medical diagnostic 
equipment which are controlled by computer programs), the USPTO consequently does not have 
a large database of internal prior art to search to determine whether or not the current applications 
are novel and non-obvious.  The USPTO has established relations with outside databases, but is 
constrained in attempts to ask specific questions about specific technologies by the requirement 
under Section 122 that the application remain confidential. 
  Recent issued patents have fanned the flames of controversy surrounding the quality of 
the USPTO’s output.  “A building block training system and training method” is directed to a 
“method of training cleaners of facilities to be used on the job which utilizes a plurality of 
pictorial displays. . .,” that is, training janitors with picture books.  Patent No. 5,851,117 (issued 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] PRIOR USER RIGHTS FOR BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS 273 
Of course, these cases were decided during the Internet explosion and e-
commerce patenting informs the debate.  Business Method Patents are 
commonly understood to include e-commerce patents such as Amazon’s “one-
click,”138 Doubleclicks advertising technique,139 Linkserve’s referral 
commission systems,140 billing methods,141 and Priceline’s reverse auction.142 
The understanding of Business Method Patents by technology developers 
and patent practitioners includes a range of definitions.  The most narrow 
would include only those techniques without novelty beyond their “business” 
techniques for, say, accounting, shopping or inventory control, such as the e-
commerce patents.  A slightly broader range encompasses data processing, as 
is evidenced by the USPTO Class 705 definitions.  An even broader 
understanding includes both the business technique and the software 
implementing it. Thus, history does not define Business Method Patents, but it 
is an important backdrop for consideration of what the Court will judge to be 
an appropriate scope for the new Prior User Defense. 
C.  Section 102(g) Prior Art Case Law 
Before being recognized as patentable, business method technologies 
(often software implemented) were typically protected as trade secrets.  Trade 
secret prior art is capable of invalidating patents, but the case law defining 
when and how this may happen is not well developed.  Proprietary know how 
that may help establish prior user rights against an asserted Business Method 
Patent, may also help invalidate a non-business method patent.  In fact, there is 
no reason why Prior User Rights and 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) cannot both be plead 
as alternative affirmative defenses to the same patent. 
In case law interpreting 35 U.S.C § 102(g) patent validity challenges,143 a 
distinction has been made between “secret” prior use and “non-informing 
 
Dec. 22, 1998).  A “decorative figure assembly from combination of component bags,” is drawn 
to a trash bag for holding raked leaves, which is decorated with a jack-o-lantern design. Patent 
No. 5,989,095 (issued Nov. 23, 1999).  This utility patent was recently upheld as valid over a 
claim of obviousness.  In re Denbiczak, 50 U.S.P.Q 2d 1614 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 137. U.S. Patent No. 5,323,184 (issued June 21, 1994). 
 138. U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 9, 1999). 
 139. U.S. Patent No. 5,948,061 (issued Sept. 7, 1999). 
 140. U.S. Patent No. 5,991,740 (issued Nov. 23, 1999). 
 141. U.S. Patent No. 5,905,726 (issued May 18, 1999). 
 142. U.S. Patent No. 5,794,207 (issued Aug. 11, 1998). 
 143. § 102 (g) states: 
An inventor shall be entitled to a patent unless – (g) before the applicant’s invention 
thereof the invention was made in this country by another who had not abandoned, 
suppressed, or concealed it.  In determining priority of invention there shall be considered 
not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but 
also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to 
practice, from a time prior to conception by the other. 
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public” use.  The leading cases are Gillman v. Stern144 and Dunlap Holdings, 
Ltd. v. Ram Golf, Corp.145  Secret prior use has been construed to fall outside 
the body of prior art capable of invalidating a patent.  A use that is public, but 
does not inform the public of how the public product was produced, has been 
held capable of invalidating prior art in some cases. 
i. Gillman v. Stern 
In Gillman v. Stern the technology in question manufactured quilts.146  In 
assembly, quilts need to be “puffed” before they are sewn shut.  The prior user 
in this case was careful to maintain the secrecy of the pneumatic machine he 
used to “puff” process his quilts.  The technique would not be discernible to a 
retailer of the quilts, purchaser of the quilts or competing quiltmaker. 
The patent was held to be valid over the user’s process.  The holding found 
the process to be “. . .as strictly secret as possible, consistent with its 
exploitation,”147 based upon facts that have since developed into the elements 
of maintaining a trade secret.  The machine was kept behind locked doors, 
visitors were restricted and the employees were sworn to secrecy. 
Since the secret process was not discernible from the product, Judge 
Learned Hand wrote that “what had not in fact enriched the art should not 
count”148 as invalidating prior art.  In dicta, Hand considered the distinction 
that had developed in the law between a “non-informing” public use and a 
“secret” use.  A non-informing public use was nevertheless an invalidating 
prior use, even though it taught the public nothing.  Hand criticized the 
caselaw’s emphasis on public use of an end product as contrary to the 
underlying theory of the law encouraging disclosure where the end product did 
not inform the public of anything about the process.149 
 
Although originally drafted as a priority dispute codification, the first sentence has come to 
embody a separate classification of prior art from Section 102 (a), “A person shall be entitled to a 
patent unless – (a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or 
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the 
applicant for a patent . . . . . .” which has been read to mean “public” knowledge or use by others.  
Section 102(g), then, is distinguished in that “made by others” under Section 102(g) does not 
necessarily mean used in public. 
 144. 114 F.2d 28 (2nd Cir. 1940), cert denied, 311 U.S. 718 (1941). 
 145. 524 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976). 
 146. See U. S. Patent No. 1,919,674 (issued Dec. 12, 1970). 
 147. Gillman, 114 F.2d at 30. 
 148. Id. at 31. 
 149. Id. 
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ii. Dunlap Holdings, Ltd. v. Ram Golf, Corp. 
In Dunlap, the technology in question was a special cut-resistant material 
used for the surface of golf balls.150  In that case, a prior user did not suppress 
or conceal the material in his early sale of the golf balls in question.  A later 
asserted patent was held to be invalid because it was not novel; that is, it was 
“anticipated” by the prior public release of the golf ball covers by another.  The 
Seventh Circuit held that although the public use did not inform the public of 
the technology, the prior use still invalidated the patent held by the second 
developer of the golf ball covers because the public had already received the 
benefit of the golf balls themselves and also because it was “fair to presume 
that the secret [composition of the golf ball cover] would be uncovered by 
potential competitors long before the time when a patent would have expired if 
the inventor had made a timely application and disclosure to the patent 
office.”151 
Finally, the Seventh Circuit articulated the equity argument of the Prior 
User Rights advocates.  It held that the first inventor is under no duty to patent 
and is free to contribute his idea to the public voluntarily, or involuntarily 
through a non-informing public use.  “In either case, although he may forfeit 
his entitlement to monopoly protection, it would be unjust to hold that such an 
election should impair his right to continue diligent efforts to market the 
product of his own invention.”152 
It is important to note the distinction made by the court between the facts 
before it and those of Gillman, and also Palmer v. Dudzik.153  Those cases 
involved prior art trade secret machines where “the benefits of using the 
machine were not made available to anyone besides the inventor.”154  In 
Dunlap the later patented article in issue was the publicly distributed golf ball 
cover, which was susceptible to reverse engineering. 
iii. Section 102(b) Cases 
This distinction made evident by the Dunlap court is further developed in 
cases construing Section 102(b).155  The Section 102(b) line of cases, which 
 
 150. See U.S. Patent No. 3,454,280 (issued Aug. 31, 1985) for “Golf Balls Having Covers of 
Ethylene-Unsaturated Monocarboxylic Acid Copolymer Compositions.” 
 151. Dunlap, 524 F.2d at 36. 
 152. Id. 
 153. 481 F.2d 1377 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
 154. Dunlap, 524 F.2d at 484. 
 155. Section 102 (b) states, “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless – (b) the invention 
was patented or described in a printed publication in this country or in a foreign country or in 
public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for 
patent in the United States . . .”  “Since 102(b) does not require public use or sale by another an 
inventor’s own use of the invention may invalidate it, if he fails to file his patent application 
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often touch on the subject of whether or nor a prior use was “public,” shed 
light on the holdings of the Section 102(g) cases.  It must be born in mind that 
Section 102(g) analysis goes strictly to novelty, while Section 102(b) caselaw 
is more often concerned with preventing an inventor from maintaining a 
monopoly for longer that the patent term; first a practical monopoly through 
secrecy and then a legal monopoly through patenting.156 
A leading case in construing public use under Section 102(b) is W.L. Gore 
& Associates v. Garlock, Inc.157  In that case, the technology in question was a 
process for stretching Teflon industrial tape.  Purchasers of the tape would be 
unable to discern if it had been stretched or not, although it performed better 
after stretching.  In holding the patent valid and unanticipated by the prior use, 
the court found that there was no evidence that the public could learn the 
claimed process by examining the tape.  The court held: 
Early public disclosure is a linchpin of the patent system.  As between a prior 
inventor who would benefit from a process by selling its product but 
suppresses, conceals or otherwise keeps the process from the public, and a later 
inventor who promptly files a patent application from which the public will 
gain a disclosure of the process, the law favors the latter.158 
It has consistently been held that “promoting the progress of the useful 
arts” under the Constitution is best served by providing an incentive (a patent 
monopoly) to those developing technology and to confer that benefit in 
exchange for public disclosure, in order to enrich the public body of technical 
knowledge. The refinement that these cases bring to the public policy 
encouraging disclosure is this:  if a use of a technology that produces a public 
product from which competitors may be able to discern the trade secret 
process, the product and the secret process that produced it will be held to be a 
public use, which may invalidate a patent issued to one who comes later to the 
technology.  Such a non-informing public use is, in effect, still held to be 
informing enough, because it will be reverse engineered and thereby enrich the 
public knowledge.  Such disclosure, albeit incomplete, justifies qualifying the 
prior use as anticipating public use capable of invalidating a later patent.  If the 
process technology cannot be discerned by competitors from the pubic use of 
the products of that technology, however, it is deemed to be “secret,” that is, 
“suppressed or concealed” under Section 102(g).  Accordingly, such a use is 
 
within a year after his first public use or sale.  The case law is well developed on what constitutes 
“public use.” 
 156. See Pfaff v. Wells Elec., Inc. 525 U.S. 55 (1998); Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon 
Bearing, 68 U.S.P.Q. 54 (2nd Cir. 1946); D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 219 U.S.P.Q. 
13 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 157. 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 158. Gore, 721 F.2d at 1550. 
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not a public use that can invalidate by anticipation a patent issued to a second 
developer of the technology.159 
Thus a first developer of a process technology is free to choose trade secret 
protection over patent protection,160 but by maintaining the technology’s use as 
secret, its developer risks having that same technology developed later by a 
competitor who patents and who will then be entitled to enjoin the first 
developer’s use of that technology.  It is accurately noted by advocates of Prior 
User Rights that the results of this legal framework are harsh.  That is, one or 
the other of the parties will lose all their rights.  If suppressed or concealed, as 
by a trade secret, the first developer who does not patent risks losing its trade 
secret, and losing its right to practice the technology.  If the technology use is 
deemed a “non-informing” public use, the second developer-patentee risks 
invalidation of the patent.161 
 
 159. See generally E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum, Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 
1436 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Thompson S.A. v. Quixote, Corp. 166 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 
Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Int’l. Trade Comm’n, 54 F.3d 756 (Fed. Cir. 1995), Amgen, Inc. v. 
Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991); New Idea Farm Equip. Corp. v. Sperry 
Corp., 916 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 160. See Kewanee Oil v. Bicron, Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
 161. Notably, in both Gillman and Dunlap, the defendants challenged patent validity with the 
prior use of a third party.  This will not arise with the new defense because it is personal under § 
273(b)(6).  In other words, patentees remain at least as vulnerable to the still available § 102(g) 
invalidation as they were before and, to the extent that the new defense encourages trade secret 
protection and those secrets are discoverable, the new defense may generate even more third party 
prior art with which to challenge patents. 
  At least one commentator, F. Andrew Ubel, Who’s on First—The Trade Secret Prior 
User or a Subsequent Patentee, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 401 (1994), has argued 
that the distinction is less an end in itself than it is a means to the end of balancing equities as the 
court sees fit, in light of the harsh winner take all nature of § 102(g) and the Gore holding. 
  In Friction Division Products Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 658 F. Supp. 998, 
3 USPQ.2d 1775 (Del. 1987), the defendant used its own prior trade secret use, not a third 
party’s, as its defense.  The product was Kevlar and the secret use was production process 
development.  In denying the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity for 
Suppression and Concealment of the prior use, the Court held that “the process itself does not 
have to be disclosed to the public in order to avoid a finding of abandonment, suppression or 
concealment of the invention.  Only the benefits of the inventors work need reach the public.”  Id. 
at 1787 (citing Dunlap, 524 F.2d at 36). 
  It is argued, then, that the “non-informing” public use versus the “secret” prior use 
distinction is a malleable standard.  The courts are more likely to find suppression and 
concealment where an “ordinary infringer” defends upon the work of a third party, and more 
likely to find the prior work is unconcealed, unsuppressed, invalidating § 102(g) art where the 
defendant is relying on its own work.  While this argument overlooks the fact that the winning 
defense in Dunlap was based on the prior use of a third party (“Butch Wagner”), as was the losing 
and criticized defense in Gillman (“Haas”), the point is well taken.  The equities are palpable, and 
the courts have been cognizant of them in ruling upon whether or not a prior use qualifies as § 
102(g) invalidating art. 
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Prior User Rights advocates point out that this Draconian result is avoided 
with Prior User Rights, which allow the first developer to continue to use its 
trade secret technology should it elect to not patent it, and also allows the 
second developer who elects patenting to continue to hold a valid patent good 
against the rest of the world.162  However, the harsh results of Section 102(g) 
are also often understood as promoting settlement by licensing, since the risk 
of losing all their rights is a powerful motivator to both parties.163  Presumably, 
Prior User Rights will remove this incentive to settle. 
In any case this line of case law may prove to be useful in defining the 
scope of the “First Inventor Defense.”  Prior uses that produce a public product 
may be distinguished as worthy of the defense or not based upon whether the 
product motivates those who would be interested in developing a similar 
technology by suggesting to them how they might go about it. 
V.  ARE BUSINESS METHODS NON-INFORMING PUBLIC USES? 
A variety of criteria can be used to define Business Method Patents, and 
with them the scope of the new defense.  Definitional criteria should be 
selected to harmonize the new defense with existing patent law, to support time 
honored public policies of disclosure and to promote certainty among 
intellectual property practitioners, developers and investors.  One criterion 
deserving consideration is whether the prior use would qualify as a “non-
informing” public use under pre-existing Section 102(g) case law.  Dunlap 
recognized some equities on behalf of a prior user, and sought to justify 
holding in accordance with them by reasoning that the disclosure of a prior 
user was sufficient even if incomplete.  The characteristics of Business 
Methods lend themselves well to such an approach. 
Moreover, nothing in the “First Inventor Defense” statute makes assertion 
of the defense mandatory.164  Should a defendant care to brave the risk of 
losing trade secret protection, the defense of invalidating the asserted patent on 
Section 102(g) grounds is still available, and indeed may be pled as an 
alternative affirmative defense. 
The line of software patentability cases leading up to State Street Bank 
suggests a range of boundaries by which Business Method Patents could be 
selectively defined.  Most narrow is that they are those patents whose novelty 
resides in the conduct of business, not in the software that implements it.165  
 
 162. Opponents of Prior User Rights point out that this has the effect of removing the 
technology from the marketplace for a period of time longer than the statutorily endorsed twenty-
year patent term. 
 163. This is the reason for . . . the paucity of 102(g) caselaw. 
 164. “It shall be a defense . . . .” AIPA, 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1) (1999) (emphasis added). 
 165. See E. Robert Yoches, Business Method Patent Litigation, available at 
http://www.dayton.edu/~/lawtech/papers/Chapter%2015.hto (last visited June 15, 2001). 
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For e-commerce patents such as the Amazon “One-Click” patent,166 the novel 
aspect is quite clear and easily reverse engineered.  Certainly, if previously 
used, such displayed functionality would qualify as an informing public use 
available to invalidate under Section 102(b) a patent issued to a later 
developer.  It is difficult to conceive of such e-commerce patents as 
“suppressed or concealed” under Section 102(g). 
USPTO Class 705 is defined, however, as “data processing.”  Business 
Methods are also agreed to include such methods as the Signature Financial 
mutual fund reconciling program.  Clearly the “hub and spoke” patent at issue 
in State Street Bank took in data and processed it to output different useful, 
concrete and tangible data sets.  Although this may be a “backroom” process 
vis-à-vis the public at large, if the relevant public is taken to be the competitors 
of the patent holder, then the awareness of the patented program’s functional 
capabilities may also prove to be as informing as the Dunlap golf ball cover.  
Accordingly the patent may still be vulnerable to invalidation by a qualifying 
and anticipating prior use.  Under Section 102(g), to the extent that these 
services can be offered while suppressing and concealing the software 
implementing them, the functionality of the program will still be known to 
competitors, and would motivate them to engineer competing products. 
Even if the definition of Business Method Patents is taken to be broad 
enough in scope to include implementing software, Section 102(g) defenses 
may still be an option worth considering for an accused first user.  It is widely 
accepted that software development over the last quarter century has been 
highly incremental in nature.  Many patented processes are thought to be 
obvious in that the problems they address could have been solved by an 
ordinarily skilled practitioner of the programming arts simply by applying any 
of a variety of preexisting programming techniques.167  In other words, most 
software is so easily reverse engineered that putting a method to use while 
suppressing and concealing its implementing software from a relevant 
audience of competitors will still serve to be a substantially informing use. 
If the foregoing is accepted to be true, then many Business Method Patents 
are highly susceptible to reverse engineering once the functions the software 
performs are used in public.  Hence, it appears that a great bulk of products and 
services implemented by software would properly be considered “non-
informing” public uses under the Section 102(g) case law.  Accordingly, if 
Prior User Rights under the new act are construed to cover business method 
subject matter which would qualify as a “non-informing” public use under 
Section 102(g), even though optimal techniques (the best mode) are suppressed 
 
 166. U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 9, 1999). 
 167. See Legal Resources and Tools for Surviving the Patenting Frenzy of the Internet, 
Bioinformatics, and Electronic Commerce, at http://www.bustpatents.com (last visited May 29, 
2001). 
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and concealed as trade secrets, the new defense would seem to do the least 
violence to the traditional patent system.  Finally, given the short life cycle of 
software, such a rule would do little practical harm either. 
In sum, the new defense is tailored for application under the “suppressed 
and concealed” language of Section 102(g).  The case law construing that 
statute has sought to ameliorate the harsh results of Section 102(g) for those 
who inform the public to some extent beyond absolute secrecy, in order to 
preserve the public policy favoring disclosure.  In so doing, these cases point to 
a useful element worthy of inclusion in whatever definition of “methods of 
doing or conducting business” the courts devise.  The defense should not apply 
beyond those methods that do not inform the public enough to motivate 
competitors to build on the disclosed functionality.  Such a holding would 
afford technology developers as much predictability in this area as they had 
before the advent of the “First Inventor Defense.” 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Major recent decisions in patent law168 have sought to promote 
predictability in the application of patent rights and certainty of the boundaries 
of those rights for the relevant community of technology generators and their 
investors.  The undefined scope of the “First Inventor Defense” runs counter to 
that policy.  The courts have been left the task of applying the defense in a 
manner that preserves as much as possible public policy in favor of certainty 
and disclosure while affording relief to earlier users according to the Act.  One 
approach is to allow the defense insofar as the prior use provides some 
information to the public, as Business Methods inherently do anyway, in view 
of Section 102(g) case law on “non-informing” public use.  To the extent that 
such an approach limits the controversial new defense, and to the extent it 
would expand the range of Section 103 art available to invalidate controversial 
business method patents, it would also serve to return the patent system to its 
traditional status.  To the extent that the courts are persuaded by the facts 
presented to them that the equities served by the new defense can be consistent 
with the public policy favoring disclosure, the new defense has an opportunity 
to grow into a broader regime from a narrow exception, as it should now 
properly be construed. 
 
 
 168. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kobashiki Co. v. Festo Crop., 234 F.3d 558; (Fed. Cir. 2001); 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton-
Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 1153 (1997). 
